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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
FRANK EDWARD PHARRIS, Case No. 890549-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. section 78-2A-3(2)(f) (Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
over "appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the entry of Appellant's plea comply with mandatory 
standards? 
Did the prosecutor fail to comply with the plea 
agreement? 
Did the trial court err on the day of trial, in 
reversing his order granting withdrawal of the guilty plea? 
Should the trial court have allowed Appellant to 
withdraw the guilty plea after the court reimposed it? 
Was Appellant's sentence based on material 
misinformation? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions are 
1 
set forth in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information signed on April 4, 
1989, with retail theft, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-602(1) J- (R. 6-7). Preliminary 
hearing was held in circuit court, the Honorable Michael F. 
Hutchings, presiding, and Appellant was bound over to district 
court on April 14, 1989 (R. 2). 
Appellant was arraigned in district court on June 23, 
1989, at which time he pled not guilty and trial was set for 
August 8, 1989 (R. 25). At the pretrial conference on July 21, 
1989, the court indicated the trial would occur on schedule (P. 
26) . 
On August 8, 1989, Appellant entered a plea of guilty, 
which the court accepted (T. 5). Appellant moved the court to 
1 Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-602 provides, in part: 
A person commits the offense of retail 
theft when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, 
conceals, carries away, transfers 
or causes to be carried away or 
transferred, any merchandise 
displayed, held, stored or offered 
for sale in a retail mercantile 
establishment with the intention of 
retaining such merchandise or with 
the intention of depriving the 
merchant permanently of the 
possession, use or benefit of such 
merchandise without paying the 
retail value of such merchandise[.] 
2 
2 
sentence him to a Class A Misdemeanor, which motion the court 
denied, sentencing Appellant to the prison for a term of zero to 
five years (T. 10). Without any objection from the prosecution, 
the Court then allowed Appellant to withdraw the guilty plea, and 
scheduled trial for 2:00 the following day (T. 11). 
On August 9, 1989, at 10:30 a.m., the trial court, on 
its own motion, reimposed the guilty plea that had been withdrawn 
the day before, and gave defense counsel and the State an 
opportunity to argue whether there was good cause to withdraw the 
reimposed plea (T. 12). Defense counsel argued that there was 
good cause, and again, the prosecution did not object to 
withdrawal of the plea (T. 12-18). The court then denied the 
motion to withdraw the reimposed guilty plea, indicating the 
sentence imposed the previous day v/ould stand (T. 20). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because this case was not tried, there is no evidence 
to cite in support of a statement of facts. The information in 
2 Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-402 indicates, in part, as 
follows: 
(1) If the court, having regard to the 
nature and circumstances of the offense of 
which the defendant was found guilty and to 
the history and character of the defendant, 
concludes that it would be unduly harsh to 
record the conviction as being for that 
category of offense established by statute 
and to sentence to the defendant to an 
alternative normally applicable to that 
offense, the court may, unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law, enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower 
category of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly. 
3 
this case reads, in part, as follows: 
COUNT 1 
RETAIL THEFT, a Third Degree Felony, at 754 
South State, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on or about April 1, 1989, in violation 
of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 602(1), Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, FRANK EDWARD MORRIS, a party to 
the offense, did take possession of, conceal, 
carry away, transfer or cause to be carried 
away or transferred, merchandise displayed, 
held, stored, or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment, to-wit: Sears, such 
merchandise consisting of a VCR, and that 
said defendant did so with the intention of 
retaining such merchandise or with the intent 
to permanently deprive said merchant of the 
possession, use or benefit of such merchan-
dise, without paying the retail value of such 
merchandise, to-wit: More than $250*00; 
• • • • 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Detective E. Price, Salt Lake City P.D., 
bases this Information on their report Case 
no. 89-31929 which he has read, and his 
personal investigation which disclosed the 
following: 
On April 1, 1989, at the Sears store at 
754 South State Street, defendant was 
observed removing from the shelf and taking 
from the store a VCR valued at more than 
$250.00 without paying for it. He was 
stopped in the parking lot in possession of 
the VCR. 
(R. 6-7). 
Additional facts concerning the performance of the 
trial court are presented in the Argument section of this brief, 
as those facts relate to the issues raised. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court failed to comply with mandatory 
standards in accepting the guilty plea on August 8, 1989. 
Specifically, the court did not establish on the record that the 
4 
plea was made in a voluntary and knowing fashion. 
Both on August 8, 1989 and on August 9, 1989, the 
prosecutor failed to comply with the plea agreement. By 
emphasizing Appellant's criminal history, the prosecutor 
effectively failed to abstain from opposing Appellant's motion to 
sentence the third degree felony as a Class A misdemeanor. 
In reimposing the guilty plea on its own motion on the 
day of trial, the trial court violated numerous rights of 
Appellant. After allowing Appellant to withdraw this plea, in 
forcing the reimposition of the plea on its own motion, and in 
refusing to allow Appellant to withdraw the reimposed plea (again 
without any impetus from the prosecution), the trial court 
violated Rule 11"s mandate that the trial court remain a neutral 
arbiter during the plea proceedings. Even if the trial court's 
action in reversing the withdrawal of the guilty plea had been 
correct, defense counsel demonstrated good cause for withdrawal 
of the reimposed plea, which was not contested by the 
prosecution. 
The trial court's sentence was based on material 
misinformation. There is no proof on the record that Appellant 
committed the retail theft because he was in need of drugs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE STRICT STANDARDS OF UTAH 
RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 IN 
ACCEPTING APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
5 
providesf in relevant part, as follows: 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a 
plea of guilty or no contest, and may not 
accept the plea until the court has found: 
(a) if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel, he has 
knowingly waived his right to 
counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily 
made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial, and 
to confront and cross-examine in 
open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea 
he waives all of those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands 
the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he is entering the 
plea; that upon trial the prosecu-
tion would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that 
the plea is an admission of all 
those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence that 
may be imposed upon him for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive senten-
ces; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a 
result of a prior plea discussion 
and plea agreement, and if so, 
what agreement has been reached; 
and 
(g) the defendant has been 
advised of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty or no contest. 
(6) Failure to advise the defendant of 
the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is 
not a ground for setting the plea aside, but 
may be the ground for extending the time to 
6 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.3 
(7).... 
(b) If sentencing recommenda-
tions are allowed by the court, the 
court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation 
as to sentence is not binding on 
the court. ... 
In what has been characterized as "a clear break with 
4 
the past'1, in State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court erected a standard of strict compliance with 
Rule 11, which standard has been recognized and emphasized in 
5 
subsequent decisions. 
As explained succinctly in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 
P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988), 
In its statement of law, the Gibbons Court 
held, "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring that constitu-
tional and Rule 11(e) requirements are 
complied with when a guilty plea is entered." 
Id. Trial courts may not rely on defense 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-13-6 provides: 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be 
withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest 
may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown 
and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest is made by motion, and 
shall be made within 30 days after the entry 
of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the 
rights of an imprisoned person under rule 
65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4 State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 672 and n.l (Utah 
1989). 
5 E.g. State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 
1988); State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App. 1989). 
counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy the 
specific requirements of Rule 11(e). _Id. at 
1313. Rather, with or without an affidavit 
or defense counsel's advice, the trial court 
must conduct an on-the-record review with 
defendant of the Rule 11(e) requirements. 
Id. at 1314. 
Id. at 94. 
The transcript of the trial court's examination of 
Appellant concerning the guilty plea (appendix 1) demonstrates 
the trial court's failure to comply with these strict standards 
in the following particulars: the court did not inform Appellant 
of his rights against self-incrimination, or that those were 
waived by the entry of the guilty plea,° and the court did not 
insure that Appellant understood "the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he [was] entering the plea., and that the plea 
[was] an admission of all those elements" , and the court did not 
insure that Appellant knew the minimum and maximum sentences 
possible.^ 
A. THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
While the trial court did inform Appellant that in 
entering a guilty plea, he was waiving rights to a jury trial, 
confrontation, cross-examination, the prosecution's burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and "other valuable 
constitutional rights", the trial court never mentioned 
6 See Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(5)(c). 
7 See Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(5)(d). 
8 See Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(5)(e). 
8 
Appellant's rights against self-incrimination or that the entry 
of his guilty plea waived his rights against self-incrimination 
(T. 3-5). 
Because the trial court did not establish on the record 
that Appellant understood his rights against self-incrimination, 
and understood the waiver of those rights resulting from his 
guilty plea, the trial court failed to meet its burden. See 
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334-35 (Utah App. 
1989)("Strict, and not just substantial, compliance with the rule 
is required."). 
B. THE NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE. 
The trial court made absolutely no inquiry on the 
record concerning Appellant's understanding of the facts of this 
case, the elements of the crime to which Appellant pled guilty, 
the relationship of the facts and the legal elements, or that 
Appellant was admitting to the commission of those legal elements 
in entering his plea. 
Because the trial court did not establish on the record 
that Appellant understood these things, the trial court failed to 
meet its burden. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-1313 
(Utah 1987)("'There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating 
in the record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge against him.'"). 
C. MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SENTENCES. 
While the trial court did ask Appellant, "Are you aware 
of the possible penalties that can be imposed for a Third Degree 
9 
Felony? Has your attorney told you what the possible penalties 
are?", to which Appellant responded, "Yes", the trial court never 
inquired into Appellant's understanding of what the possible 
penalties actually were (i.e. the record does not demonstrate 
whether Appellant thought the possible maximum sentence was five 
years or life without parole). 
Because the trial court did not establish on the record 
that Appellant understood the minimum and maximum possible 
sentences (0-5 years), the trial court failed to meet its burden. 
Cf. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988)(discussing 
defendant's understanding of the nature and elements of the 
offense, the Court suggested that the most effective method of 
creating a record reflecting a voluntary plea is to have the 
defendant state his understanding on the record in his own 
words). 
D. THE FACIAL INVALIDITY OF THE ENTRY OF THE PLEA MAY BE RAISED 
ON APPEAL. 
During the court's examination of Appellant, defense 
counsel did not reiterate the trial court's burden to follow Rule 
11 strictly. The facial invalidity of these proceedings may, 
however, be raised for the first time on appeal. See e.g., State 
v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334-1335 (Utah App. 1989)("Although 
the issue here was first raised on appeal by appellant, in 
certain cases we may consider the failure to comply with Rule 
11(5) and Gibbons as error sufficiently manifest and fundamental 
to be first raised on appeal to this court."). 
II. 
10 
THE PROSECUTOR FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT. 
On August 8, 1989, Appellant entered a plea of guilty 
to the charge of retail theft, with the understanding that the 
prosecutor would not oppose his motion for sentencing the third 
degree felony as a Class A misdemeanor (T. 2). 
A. THE PROSECUTOR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT. 
In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court explained the crucial role of prosecutorial 
integrity in the plea process. The Court first explained that a 
plea cannot be considered voluntarily entered unless the 
defendant has an accurate understanding of the actual value of 
the commitments made by him to the prosecutor in the plea 
agreement. _Id. at 1274. The Court continued: 
It is well established that a prosecutor 
may not make promises which induce a guilty 
plea and then refuse to keep those promises. 
"[A] constant factor is that when a plea 
rests in any significant degree on a promise 
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it 
can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 
(1971). 
Id. at 1276. 
While the prosecutor in the instant case never said the 
words, "I oppose Appellant's motion for sentencing as a Class A 
Misdemeanor," the intent and effect of the prosecutor's argument 
to the trial court was to oppose the motion. 
At that hearing, after defense counsel argued why the 
court should sentence Appellant to a Class A misdemeanor, the 
11 
prosecutor commented as follows: 
MR. ELLETT: Let me give you some 
background on the Defendant, so you'll be 
aware of his history, going back to 1979, 
when he was convicted of retail theft, 
sentenced, and fined, misdemeanor at that 
point in time. In 1980 and 1979 he was also 
convicted of robbery and sentenced to the 
Utah State Prison. He was paroled from the 
prison in 1981— '82, excuse me and that was 
revoked, and he was then committed again to 
the Utah State Prison and paroled in 1985; 
that was revoked in September of '85 and then 
paroled again in December of '85. Then in 
1986, convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute and was 
sentenced at that time to one to fifteen at 
the Utah State Prison. 
I assume, when he was placed out on that 
is when this occurred and now been revoked 
and back in prison to serve that term. So he 
has a history from 1979 through here with one 
robbery involved in it. ANd so he is not new 
to the system. And so whatever the Court 
wishes to do or consider, I think that should 
be taken into consideration. 
We would have no objection, Your Honor, 
since Mr. Matheson talked to Mr. Valdez and 
indicated he would not oppose the Court's 
running concurrently, any sentence that is 
imposed today with the sentence that he is 
now set to serve at the Utah State Prison. 
(T. 7-8). 
On August 9, 1989, the prosecutor's only comment during 
the reimposition of the guilty plea and the court's determination 
that the reimposed plea should not be withdrawn, was as follows: 
MR. ELLETT: Only to advise the Court, 
that my information is, that Mr. Pharris was 
released from prison in 1980 and went back to 
prison in 1986, and, as indicated was 
released approximately the end of February of 
this year and placed on intensive supervision 
in the intensive supervision parole division 
of A P and P. And aside from that, Your 
Honor, I think we have all of the information 
concerning Mr. Pharris. 
12 
(T. 17). 
In emphasizing Appellant's criminal record (which was 
already contained in the district court file (R. 9-14)), the 
prosecutor violated his promise not to oppose the lesser 
sentence, or stripped the promise of the value it held in 
Appellant's eyes at the time Appellant entered the guilty plea. 
Under the standards set forth in State v. Copeland, supra, the 
9 
entry of the guilty plea was invalid. 
B. THIS ISSUE MAY BE ADDRESSED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
On August 9, 1989, after the trial court reimposed the 
previously withdrawn guilty plea, and asked defense counsel to 
articulate good cause for withdrawal of the reimposed plea, 
defense counsel noted, "But first of all, the State has agreed 
not to oppose our motion to reduce the sentence as a Class A." 
(T. 12). 
Even if defense counsel's statement were not considered 
adequate to bring the prosecutor's misconduct to the trial 
9 See also United States v. Corsentino, 685 F.2d 48 (2d 
Cir. 1982)(prosecution breached plea agreement to "take no 
position at sentence"; "[t]he unmistakable import of the 
prosecutor's remarks was to urge the District Judge to impose a 
substantial sentence."); United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 
723 (5th Cir. 1977)(prosecution breached plea agreement to 
recommend a particular sentence when prosecutor acknowledged the 
obligation to recommend the sentence agreed upon, but in effect 
argued against the recommendation); United States v. Brown, 500 
F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974)(prosecution breached plea agreement to 
recommend a particular sentence when prosecutor's argument 
"effectively undercut" the recommendation); U.S. v. McCray, 849 
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1988)(prosecution breached plea agreement to 
abstain from making a sentencing recommendation when prosecutor 
opposed parole after sentence was imposed). 
13 
court's attention, the prosecutor's misconduct may be addressed 
for the first time on appeal* 
The purpose of this contemporaneous objection rule is 
to insure that the trial court is given an opportunity to correct 
errors in an efficient and dignified manner. State v. McCardell, 
652 P.2d 942f 947 (Utah 1982). Where a contemporaneous objection 
would be futile, it is not required. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 
56, 59 (Utah 1982). 
An objection to the trial court in the instant case 
would have had no useful impact. Even if the trial court was 
not influenced by the prosecutor's argument, under Santobello and 
its progeny, Appellant was entitled to receive the full value of 
the plea bargain that induced him to enter the plea. See e.g., 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1276 (Utah 1988)("In 
Santobello, the prosecutor promised not to make any 
recommendations concerning the defendant's sentence in return for 
the defendant's guilty plea to a lesser offense than he had been 
charged with.... That promise was not kept. The United States 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case even though the 
recommendation had not influenced the trial judge."). 
There was no point in defense counsel's raising a 
contemporaneous objection concerning the prosecutor's misconduct 
because the court could not undo the prosecutor's damage. "[T]he 
sentence must ... be vacated if the agreement was not kept 
because the defendant offers his plea not in exchange for the 
actual sentence or impact on the judge, but for the prosecutor's 
14 
statements in court," United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 723 
(5th Cir. 1977). 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REIMPOSITION 
OF THE WITHDRAWN GUILTY PLEA 
MUST BE REVERSED. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT BEHAVED IN AN UNEXPLAINABLE AND ERRATIC 
MANNER. 
On August 8th, the court accepted the guilty plea, 
denied the motion for a lesser conviction and sentence, and 
sentenced Appellant to serve a term of zero to five years at the 
Utah State Prison (T. 10-11). 
The court then granted Appellant's motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea, in the following circumstances: 
MR. VALDEZ: Mr. Pharris indicated to me, 
he would, at this time, like to move to 
withdraw his previously entered plea of 
guilty and try it, Judge. And I don't feel 
like I am doin' my client a service by 
pleading him guilty as charged, if there is 
not some sort of concession without going to 
trial on it. 
THE COURT: That's the Court's decision 
as long as it wasn't from any other source, 
you wanted to do that, that's fine. You may 
withdraw your plea. 
(T. 11). The State did not oppose the withdrawal of the guilty 
plea, and the trial was scheduled to go forward the next day at 
2:00 p.m. (T. 11). 
At 10:30 a.m. on August 9, 1989, the date the trial was 
to occur, the trial court, acting on its own motion, "reversed 
the motion" to withdraw the guilty plea, stating: 
The reason I feel I was in error is, 
that the statute provides that a plea of 
guilty may be withdrawn only for good cause 
15 
shown and with leave of the Court; so the 
leave is withdrawn. Now, at this point your 
motion is pending before the Court, Mr. 
Valdez, and if you wish to tell me the 
reasons, the good cause, why I should grant 
that motion, I'll be glad to hear you. 
(T. 12). 
After defense counsel argued for the withdrawal of the 
reimposed plea, the prosecutor again did not oppose withdrawal of 
the plea (T. 17) . 
The court indicated that the motion to withdraw the 
reimposed guilty plea was denied, and the sentence originally 
imposed would stand (T. 19-20). The minute entries for August 8, 
1989, and August 9, 1989, and the judgment and sentence signed by 
the court on August 10, 1989 are included in Appendix 2. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY. 
If Appellant's trial had gone as scheduled on August 9, 
1989, at 2:00 p.m., his guilty plea would not have been 
admissible evidence. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 
(1927). Yet, according to the reasoning of the trial court, at 
the whim of the trial court, three and a half hours prior to the 
time appointed for the trial, that guilty plea could supplant 
the entire trial and Appellant's constitutional trial rights. 
Particularly because the trial court was acting on its own 
motion, without any support from the prosecution, such reasoning 
must be reversed. 
In State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated the obvious: a trial judge has no business 
wielding influence in the plea process. The Court explained: 
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These provisions governing the trial court's 
conduct attempt to insure that the trial 
court will not improperly participate in the 
plea negotiations, the possible consequence 
of such participation being to render the 
plea involuntary and subject to attack. 
United States v. Gilligan, 256 F.Supp. 244, 
253 (S.D.N.Y.1966). Such participation may 
also undermine the judge's proper function as 
a neutral arbiter and transform him into an 
advocate for whatever proposed resolution the 
judge favors. United States v. Werker, 535 
F.2d 198, 203(2d Cir 1976), cert, denied, 429 
U.S. 926, 97 S.Ct. 330, 50 L.Ed.2d 296 
(1976). 
Id. at 1299-1300. See also Justice Hall's concurring opinion, in 
which he further decries the "evil" of judicial participation in 
plea bargaining, at pages 1307-1309. 
The trial court's conduct in this case went beyond that 
condemned in Kay. The trial court did not merely meddle in plea 
negotiations between Appellant and the prosecution, but instead 
forced Appellant to stand convicted on an involuntary guilty 
plea. The trial court is solely responsible for the guilty plea 
and conviction - the prosecutor never opposed the initial 
withdrawal of the guilty plea; the prosecutor never sought the 
reimposition of the withdrawn plea; the prosecutor never opposed 
the withdrawal of the reimposed plea. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court 
should be reversed for reimposing the withdrawn guilty plea. 
IV. 
HAD THE REIMPOSITION OF THE PLEA BEEN PROPER, 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE REIMPOSED PLEA. 
On August 9, 1989, prior to imposing the sentence, the 
trial court invited defense counsel to establish good cause for 
17 
withdrawal of the reimposed plea (T. 12). Defense counsel, 
apparently caught off guard by the court's sua sponte and 
unexpected actions on the morning of the trial, addressed both 
withdrawal of the guilty plea and imposition of a lesser sentence 
(T. 12-20). He first noted that the state agreed not to oppose 
the motion for a lesser sentence (T. 12). He indicated that 
Appellant had entered the plea in strong hopes that the court 
would grant the lower sentence (T. 18), and should be allowed to 
withdraw the plea because defense counsel had not given the court 
sufficient information concerning the motion for a lesser 
sentence (T. 18). 
Defense counsel then presented the additional 
information, which called into question Appellant's intent to 
10 
deprive Sears of the VCR. Apparently, eighteen days prior to 
the incident at Sears, Appellant was paroled from the prison (T. 
13). Appellant had asked to be placed in a halfway house or 
otherwise assisted in assimilating back into society, but the 
prison apparently was unable to assist Appellant, beyond giving 
him $100 (T. 13). Subsequent to his parole and prior to this 
offense, Appellant apparently contacted his parole officer, again 
asking for assistance, and again being told to fend for himself 
(T. 14). Defense counsel characterized the incident at Sears as 
10 Compare State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1983)(trial court abused its discretion in refusing withdrawal of 
guilty plea because the court failed to make finding that the 
defendant understood the nature and elements of the offense, and 
because the only information relating to the offense demonstrated 
that the defendant did not have the requisite intent). 
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"a scream for help", noting that when Appellant was apprehended, 
he made no effort to flee (T. 14). 
The prosecutor did not oppose withdrawal of the plea 
(T. 17). 
As noted in State v. Gallegos# 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1987): 
The entry of a guilty plea involves the 
waiver of several important constitutional 
rights, including the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to 
trial by jury, and the right to confront 
witnesses. Because the entry of such a plea 
constitutes such a waiver, and because the 
prosecution will generally be unable to show 
that it will suffer any significant prejudice 
if the plea is withdrawn, a presentence 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in 
general, be liberally granted. 
Id. at 1041-1042. 
Because the initial plea in this case was entered 
improperly, because the withdrawn plea was reimposed against 
Appellant's will, because defense counsel gave the court 
additional information relating to good cause to withdraw the 
plea, and because the prosecution did not object to the 
withdrawal of the plea, the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the second motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
V. 
APPELLANT'S SENTENCE WAS BASED 
ON MATERIAL MISINFORMATION. 
The apparent basis for the denial of the motion for a 
lesser sentence was the trial court's baseless conclusion that 
the retail theft was motivated by a need for illegal drugs. When 
defense counsel was arguing that Appellant's criminal history did 
19 
not involve violence to others, the trial court interjected 
Well, the drug crimes are just horrendous. 
(T. 7). In imposing sentence, the court stated: 
The Court is deeply concerned that in 
the situation we find ourselves today, the 
largest number of crimes, including crimes of 
this nature, are created because of drug 
problems. While I may not feel as offended 
by somebody stealing a vcr from Sears, as 
they steal them from a home, it happens both 
ways and being done for the same, exact 
reasons. And I just can't feel that I can 
send a message to the Board that says that I 
think that this individual ought to be 
treated lightly, simply be reasons of the 
fact that the vcr was less than $250 and not 
even sure that's a very good measurement of 
the basis upon the differentiations for 
sentencing. But that's what we're talking 
about, with what our legislature has done. 
But I think that the time has come and needs 
to be done. That we have got to get serious 
about people who cannot keep their hands off 
things that don't belong to them. 
(T. 10). 
While sentencing is generally a matter left to the 
discretion of the trial court, the trial court is prohibited by 
constitutional guarantees of due process from basing a sentence 
on misinformation. State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 
1986). Because the trial court's sentence was based on the 
notion that the theft was drug-related, this court should, at 
the very least, remand for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant asks this Court to remand this case to the 
trial court with an order to allow Appellant to withdraw the 
reimposed guilty plea. 
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WHEREUPON the following proceedings were 
had: 
MR. ELLETT: Plea as charged, with the understand-] 
-ing, that he can make a motion to have the case senteced 
as a Class A at the time of sentencing. 
MR. VALDEZ: Probably ask he be sentenced today. 
THE COURT: You want to force me to make that 
decision right today? 
MR. VALDEZ: Well, Judge, in view of his circum-
stances, I don't know that there will be plenty of infor-
mation for you to make that decision. 
THE COURT: Allright*. You been arraigned on 
'
2
 I this;that was why the bench warrant was issued? 
13 !
 MR. VALDEZ: We had some problem, I think, Judge, 
14 He was at the prison;nobody knew about that. A bench 
warrant issued and 
THE COURT: Is this 
MR. ELLETT: It was set for trial for today. 
THE COURT: As a matter of fact, set for trial 
today. You're right. 
MR. ELLETT: Yes. It' s my understanding, Your 
Honor, from the record, that the Defendant intends to entejr 
a plea of guilty as charged today. Part of the negotiatid 
for that plea is that we would not oppose the motion of the 
Defendant to move the Court to sentence at one degree lowejr 
as provided by the statute. 
n 
1 TiTE COURT: Al l r i g h t . Mr. P h a r r i s i s your t r u e 
2 and c o r r e c t name? 
3 I A* Yes . 
4 Q. Have you gone over the Defehdant's Statement 
5 with your attorney? 
5 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Do you read and understand the English languagfa? 
8 I A. Yes. 
9 Q. Are you currently acting under the influence 
JO of any drug or alcohol? 
I j A. No. 
12 Q. Have you been promised anything other than the] 
13 plea bargain itself or have you been threatened in any way) 
14 which would cause you to enter into this plea bargain? 
15 A. No. 
15 Q. Are you doing so freely and of your own 
17 volition? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Allright. Now# you're entitled to certain 
20 constitutional protections;you*re entitled to a trial witlj 
21 a jury, if you wish it, you're entitled to confront and 
22 cross-examine the witnesses against you, you're entitled 
23 to require the State to prove the charges agairtb you 
24 beyond a reasonable doubt and you're entitled to appeal 
25 if you were found guilty. If you sign this plea bargain 
10 
11 
. serving or currently serving—only one charge here 
A. I am aware. 
- Q. Are you, at this time, prepared to enter a 
4 plea? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. How then do you charge to Count One, retail 
7 theft,a Third Degree Felony? 
8 A. Guilty. 
9 THE COURT: Allright. If you wish to, you can 
sign the Defendant's Statement ;and the Court finds that 
the Defendant entered a Plea of Guilty voluntarily and 
j2 J knowingly, after he had been advised of his rights, which 
j3 he understands. 
14 MR. VALDEZ: May I approach the bench? 
15 THE COURT: Are both the Prosecution and Defense 
15 counsel satisfied with the contents of the affidavit? 
17 MR. ELLETT: Yes, State is, Your Honor. 
18 MR. VALDEZ: Yes, Sir. 
19 THE COURT: The Defendant's Statement? Thank you.| 
20 You're entitled to be sentenced in not less than two nor 
2i more than thirty days. You're also entitled, if you wish,| 
22 to have a pre-sentence report done by Adult Probation and 
23 Parole;and you may also waive those two rights, if you 
24 wish to. 
25 MR* VALDEZ: He would wish to waive that right, 
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ATP ELLETT, BUD PRESENT 
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DEFT IS IN UTAH STATE PRISON 
COMES NOW THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT AND BEING REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL 
AS APPEARS ABOVE AND MOVES THE COURT AND IS GRANTED TO LEAVE TO 
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF NOT GUILTY HERETOFOR ENTERED. WHEREUPON, THE 
DEFENDANT NOW ENTERS A PLEA OF GUILTY TO THE CRIME OF 
RETAIL THEFT, 3RD DEGREE FELONY AS CHARGED 
AND WAIVES TIME FOR PASSING OF SENTENCE AND 
SAME IS SET FOR NOW, SEE JUDGMENT. 
AFTER THE DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED, HE WITHDREW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
THE COURT ORDERED THAT THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE WILL START ON 
AUGUST 9, 1989 AT 2:00 P.M. 
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D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
PHARRIS, FRANK 
DEFENDANT 
DEFT IS IN UTAH STATE PRISON 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 891900518 FS 
DATE 08/09/89 
HONORABLE RICHARD H MOFFAT 
COURT REPORTER HAL WALTON 
COURT CLERK KBG 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. ELLETT, BUD 
D. ATTY. VALDEZ, JAMES 
THE COURT ON IT'S OWN MOTION ORDERS THAT THIS CASE COME NOW 
BEFORE THE COURT FOR A HEARING ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. THE APPEARANCES ARE AS SHOWN ABOVE. 
THE COURT REPRESENTS TO COUNSEL THAT THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN 
LETTING THE DEFENDANT WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA AND GO TO TRIAL. 
THE COURT, THEREFORE, REVERSES ITS DECISION TO LET THE DEFENDANT 
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA IN THIS CASE. THE COURT ASKS THE 
DEFENDANT IF HE HAS GOOD CAUSE TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA IN 
THIS CASE. COMES NOW RESPECTIVE COUNSEL AND ARGUE THE MATTER TO 
THE COURT. BASED UPON THE ARGUMENTS, THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE 
IS NOT GOOD CAUSE FOR THE DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF 
GUILTY IN THIS CASE, AND THE MOTION IS DENIED. THE COURT ORDERS 
THAT THE SENTENCE THAT WAS GIVEN TO THE DEFENDANT ON AUGUST 8, 
1989 IN THIS CASE WILL STAND. 
